diff --git a/communicator/ssh/communicator.go b/communicator/ssh/communicator.go index 85dabb6b5..f9d183976 100644 --- a/communicator/ssh/communicator.go +++ b/communicator/ssh/communicator.go @@ -125,11 +125,13 @@ func (c *Communicator) Connect(o terraform.UIOutput) (err error) { " User: %s\n"+ " Password: %t\n"+ " Private key: %t\n"+ - " SSH Agent: %t", + " SSH Agent: %t\n"+ + " Checking Host Key: %t", c.connInfo.Host, c.connInfo.User, c.connInfo.Password != "", c.connInfo.PrivateKey != "", c.connInfo.Agent, + c.connInfo.HostKey != "", )) if c.connInfo.BastionHost != "" { @@ -139,11 +141,13 @@ func (c *Communicator) Connect(o terraform.UIOutput) (err error) { " User: %s\n"+ " Password: %t\n"+ " Private key: %t\n"+ - " SSH Agent: %t", + " SSH Agent: %t\n"+ + " Checking Host Key: %t", c.connInfo.BastionHost, c.connInfo.BastionUser, c.connInfo.BastionPassword != "", c.connInfo.BastionPrivateKey != "", c.connInfo.Agent, + c.connInfo.BastionHostKey != "", )) } } diff --git a/communicator/ssh/communicator_test.go b/communicator/ssh/communicator_test.go index b2344fa55..9a2d715f2 100644 --- a/communicator/ssh/communicator_test.go +++ b/communicator/ssh/communicator_test.go @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ package ssh import ( "bufio" "bytes" + "encoding/base64" "fmt" "io" "io/ioutil" @@ -13,6 +14,7 @@ import ( "os" "path/filepath" "regexp" + "strconv" "strings" "testing" @@ -50,21 +52,26 @@ gqnBycHj6AhEycjda75cs+0zybZvN4x65KZHOGW/O/7OAWEcZP5TPb3zf9ned3Hl NsZoFj52ponUM6+99A2CmezFCN16c4mbA//luWF+k3VVqR6BpkrhKw== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----` -var serverConfig = &ssh.ServerConfig{ - PasswordCallback: acceptUserPass("user", "pass"), - PublicKeyCallback: acceptPublicKey(testClientPublicKey), -} +// this cert was signed by the key from testCAPublicKey +const testServerHostCert = `ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com 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` -func init() { - // Parse and set the private key of the server, required to accept connections - signer, err := ssh.ParsePrivateKey([]byte(testServerPrivateKey)) - if err != nil { - panic("unable to parse private key: " + err.Error()) +const testCAPublicKey = `ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQCrozyZIhdEvalCn+eSzHH94cO9ykiywA13ntWI7mJcHBwYTeCYWG8E9zGXyp2iDOjCGudM0Tdt8o0OofKChk9Z/qiUN0G8y1kmaXBlBM3qA5R9NPpvMYMNkYLfX6ivtZCnqrsbzaoqN2Oc/7H2StHzJWh/XCGu9otQZA6vdv1oSmAsZOjw/xIGaGQqDUaLq21J280PP1qSbdJHf76iSHE+TWe3YpqV946JWM5tCh0DykZ10VznvxYpUjzhr07IN3tVKxOXbPnnU7lX6IaLIWgfzLqwSyheeux05c3JLF9iF4sFu8ou4hwQz1iuUTU1jxgwZP0w/bkXgFFs0949lW81` + +func newMockLineServer(t *testing.T, signer ssh.Signer) string { + serverConfig := &ssh.ServerConfig{ + PasswordCallback: acceptUserPass("user", "pass"), + PublicKeyCallback: acceptPublicKey(testClientPublicKey), + } + + var err error + if signer == nil { + signer, err = ssh.ParsePrivateKey([]byte(testServerPrivateKey)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("unable to parse private key: %s", err) + } } serverConfig.AddHostKey(signer) -} -func newMockLineServer(t *testing.T) string { l, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0") if err != nil { t.Fatalf("Unable to listen for connection: %s", err) @@ -111,7 +118,7 @@ func newMockLineServer(t *testing.T) string { } func TestNew_Invalid(t *testing.T) { - address := newMockLineServer(t) + address := newMockLineServer(t, nil) parts := strings.Split(address, ":") r := &terraform.InstanceState{ @@ -139,7 +146,7 @@ func TestNew_Invalid(t *testing.T) { } func TestStart(t *testing.T) { - address := newMockLineServer(t) + address := newMockLineServer(t, nil) parts := strings.Split(address, ":") r := &terraform.InstanceState{ @@ -171,6 +178,148 @@ func TestStart(t *testing.T) { } } +func TestHostKey(t *testing.T) { + // get the server's public key + signer, err := ssh.ParsePrivateKey([]byte(testServerPrivateKey)) + if err != nil { + panic("unable to parse private key: " + err.Error()) + } + pubKey := fmt.Sprintf("ssh-rsa %s", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(signer.PublicKey().Marshal())) + + address := newMockLineServer(t, nil) + host, p, _ := net.SplitHostPort(address) + port, _ := strconv.Atoi(p) + + connInfo := &connectionInfo{ + User: "user", + Password: "pass", + Host: host, + HostKey: pubKey, + Port: port, + Timeout: "30s", + } + + cfg, err := prepareSSHConfig(connInfo) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + c := &Communicator{ + connInfo: connInfo, + config: cfg, + } + + var cmd remote.Cmd + stdout := new(bytes.Buffer) + cmd.Command = "echo foo" + cmd.Stdout = stdout + + if err := c.Start(&cmd); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := c.Disconnect(); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + // now check with the wrong HostKey + address = newMockLineServer(t, nil) + _, p, _ = net.SplitHostPort(address) + port, _ = strconv.Atoi(p) + + connInfo.HostKey = testClientPublicKey + connInfo.Port = port + + cfg, err = prepareSSHConfig(connInfo) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + c = &Communicator{ + connInfo: connInfo, + config: cfg, + } + + err = c.Start(&cmd) + if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "mismatch") { + t.Fatalf("expected host key mismatch, got error:%v", err) + } +} + +func TestHostCert(t *testing.T) { + pk, _, _, _, err := ssh.ParseAuthorizedKey([]byte(testServerHostCert)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + signer, err := ssh.ParsePrivateKey([]byte(testServerPrivateKey)) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + signer, err = ssh.NewCertSigner(pk.(*ssh.Certificate), signer) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + address := newMockLineServer(t, signer) + host, p, _ := net.SplitHostPort(address) + port, _ := strconv.Atoi(p) + + connInfo := &connectionInfo{ + User: "user", + Password: "pass", + Host: host, + HostKey: testCAPublicKey, + Port: port, + Timeout: "30s", + } + + cfg, err := prepareSSHConfig(connInfo) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + c := &Communicator{ + connInfo: connInfo, + config: cfg, + } + + var cmd remote.Cmd + stdout := new(bytes.Buffer) + cmd.Command = "echo foo" + cmd.Stdout = stdout + + if err := c.Start(&cmd); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := c.Disconnect(); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + // now check with the wrong HostKey + address = newMockLineServer(t, signer) + _, p, _ = net.SplitHostPort(address) + port, _ = strconv.Atoi(p) + + connInfo.HostKey = testClientPublicKey + connInfo.Port = port + + cfg, err = prepareSSHConfig(connInfo) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + c = &Communicator{ + connInfo: connInfo, + config: cfg, + } + + err = c.Start(&cmd) + if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "authorities") { + t.Fatalf("expected host key mismatch, got error:%v", err) + } +} + func TestAccUploadFile(t *testing.T) { // use the local ssh server and scp binary to check uploads if ok := os.Getenv("SSH_UPLOAD_TEST"); ok == "" { diff --git a/communicator/ssh/provisioner.go b/communicator/ssh/provisioner.go index 69923017e..b6cb1b05f 100644 --- a/communicator/ssh/provisioner.go +++ b/communicator/ssh/provisioner.go @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import ( "github.com/xanzy/ssh-agent" "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh" "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent" + "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts" ) const ( @@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ type connectionInfo struct { Password string PrivateKey string `mapstructure:"private_key"` Host string + HostKey string `mapstructure:"host_key"` Port int Agent bool Timeout string @@ -53,6 +55,7 @@ type connectionInfo struct { BastionPassword string `mapstructure:"bastion_password"` BastionPrivateKey string `mapstructure:"bastion_private_key"` BastionHost string `mapstructure:"bastion_host"` + BastionHostKey string `mapstructure:"bastion_host_key"` BastionPort int `mapstructure:"bastion_port"` AgentIdentity string `mapstructure:"agent_identity"` @@ -144,34 +147,38 @@ func prepareSSHConfig(connInfo *connectionInfo) (*sshConfig, error) { return nil, err } + host := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", connInfo.Host, connInfo.Port) + sshConf, err := buildSSHClientConfig(sshClientConfigOpts{ user: connInfo.User, + host: host, privateKey: connInfo.PrivateKey, password: connInfo.Password, + hostKey: connInfo.HostKey, sshAgent: sshAgent, }) if err != nil { return nil, err } + connectFunc := ConnectFunc("tcp", host) + var bastionConf *ssh.ClientConfig if connInfo.BastionHost != "" { + bastionHost := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", connInfo.BastionHost, connInfo.BastionPort) + bastionConf, err = buildSSHClientConfig(sshClientConfigOpts{ user: connInfo.BastionUser, + host: bastionHost, privateKey: connInfo.BastionPrivateKey, password: connInfo.BastionPassword, + hostKey: connInfo.HostKey, sshAgent: sshAgent, }) if err != nil { return nil, err } - } - host := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", connInfo.Host, connInfo.Port) - connectFunc := ConnectFunc("tcp", host) - - if bastionConf != nil { - bastionHost := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", connInfo.BastionHost, connInfo.BastionPort) connectFunc = BastionConnectFunc("tcp", bastionHost, bastionConf, "tcp", host) } @@ -188,11 +195,41 @@ type sshClientConfigOpts struct { password string sshAgent *sshAgent user string + host string + hostKey string } func buildSSHClientConfig(opts sshClientConfigOpts) (*ssh.ClientConfig, error) { + hkCallback := ssh.InsecureIgnoreHostKey() + + if opts.hostKey != "" { + // The knownhosts package only takes paths to files, but terraform + // generally wants to handle config data in-memory. Rather than making + // the known_hosts file an exception, write out the data to a temporary + // file to create the HostKeyCallback. + tf, err := ioutil.TempFile("", "tf-known_hosts") + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create temp known_hosts file: %s", err) + } + defer tf.Close() + defer os.RemoveAll(tf.Name()) + + // we mark this as a CA as well, but the host key fallback will still + // use it as a direct match if the remote host doesn't return a + // certificate. + if _, err := tf.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("@cert-authority %s %s\n", opts.host, opts.hostKey)); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write temp known_hosts file: %s", err) + } + tf.Sync() + + hkCallback, err = knownhosts.New(tf.Name()) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + conf := &ssh.ClientConfig{ - HostKeyCallback: ssh.InsecureIgnoreHostKey(), + HostKeyCallback: hkCallback, User: opts.user, } diff --git a/terraform/eval_validate.go b/terraform/eval_validate.go index e48af84ac..16bca3587 100644 --- a/terraform/eval_validate.go +++ b/terraform/eval_validate.go @@ -144,8 +144,10 @@ func (n *EvalValidateProvisioner) validateConnConfig(connConfig *ResourceConfig) // For type=ssh only (enforced in ssh communicator) PrivateKey interface{} `mapstructure:"private_key"` + HostKey interface{} `mapstructure:"host_key"` Agent interface{} `mapstructure:"agent"` BastionHost interface{} `mapstructure:"bastion_host"` + BastionHostKey interface{} `mapstructure:"bastion_host_key"` BastionPort interface{} `mapstructure:"bastion_port"` BastionUser interface{} `mapstructure:"bastion_user"` BastionPassword interface{} `mapstructure:"bastion_password"` diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0f8efdbaa --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package ChaCha20 implements the core ChaCha20 function as specified in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7539#section-2.3. +package chacha20 + +import "encoding/binary" + +const rounds = 20 + +// core applies the ChaCha20 core function to 16-byte input in, 32-byte key k, +// and 16-byte constant c, and puts the result into 64-byte array out. +func core(out *[64]byte, in *[16]byte, k *[32]byte) { + j0 := uint32(0x61707865) + j1 := uint32(0x3320646e) + j2 := uint32(0x79622d32) + j3 := uint32(0x6b206574) + j4 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(k[0:4]) + j5 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(k[4:8]) + j6 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(k[8:12]) + j7 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(k[12:16]) + j8 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(k[16:20]) + j9 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(k[20:24]) + j10 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(k[24:28]) + j11 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(k[28:32]) + j12 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(in[0:4]) + j13 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(in[4:8]) + j14 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(in[8:12]) + j15 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(in[12:16]) + + x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7 := j0, j1, j2, j3, j4, j5, j6, j7 + x8, x9, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15 := j8, j9, j10, j11, j12, j13, j14, j15 + + for i := 0; i < rounds; i += 2 { + x0 += x4 + x12 ^= x0 + x12 = (x12 << 16) | (x12 >> (16)) + x8 += x12 + x4 ^= x8 + x4 = (x4 << 12) | (x4 >> (20)) + x0 += x4 + x12 ^= x0 + x12 = (x12 << 8) | (x12 >> (24)) + x8 += x12 + x4 ^= x8 + x4 = (x4 << 7) | (x4 >> (25)) + x1 += x5 + x13 ^= x1 + x13 = (x13 << 16) | (x13 >> 16) + x9 += x13 + x5 ^= x9 + x5 = (x5 << 12) | (x5 >> 20) + x1 += x5 + x13 ^= x1 + x13 = (x13 << 8) | (x13 >> 24) + x9 += x13 + x5 ^= x9 + x5 = (x5 << 7) | (x5 >> 25) + x2 += x6 + x14 ^= x2 + x14 = (x14 << 16) | (x14 >> 16) + x10 += x14 + x6 ^= x10 + x6 = (x6 << 12) | (x6 >> 20) + x2 += x6 + x14 ^= x2 + x14 = (x14 << 8) | (x14 >> 24) + x10 += x14 + x6 ^= x10 + x6 = (x6 << 7) | (x6 >> 25) + x3 += x7 + x15 ^= x3 + x15 = (x15 << 16) | (x15 >> 16) + x11 += x15 + x7 ^= x11 + x7 = (x7 << 12) | (x7 >> 20) + x3 += x7 + x15 ^= x3 + x15 = (x15 << 8) | (x15 >> 24) + x11 += x15 + x7 ^= x11 + x7 = (x7 << 7) | (x7 >> 25) + x0 += x5 + x15 ^= x0 + x15 = (x15 << 16) | (x15 >> 16) + x10 += x15 + x5 ^= x10 + x5 = (x5 << 12) | (x5 >> 20) + x0 += x5 + x15 ^= x0 + x15 = (x15 << 8) | (x15 >> 24) + x10 += x15 + x5 ^= x10 + x5 = (x5 << 7) | (x5 >> 25) + x1 += x6 + x12 ^= x1 + x12 = (x12 << 16) | (x12 >> 16) + x11 += x12 + x6 ^= x11 + x6 = (x6 << 12) | (x6 >> 20) + x1 += x6 + x12 ^= x1 + x12 = (x12 << 8) | (x12 >> 24) + x11 += x12 + x6 ^= x11 + x6 = (x6 << 7) | (x6 >> 25) + x2 += x7 + x13 ^= x2 + x13 = (x13 << 16) | (x13 >> 16) + x8 += x13 + x7 ^= x8 + x7 = (x7 << 12) | (x7 >> 20) + x2 += x7 + x13 ^= x2 + x13 = (x13 << 8) | (x13 >> 24) + x8 += x13 + x7 ^= x8 + x7 = (x7 << 7) | (x7 >> 25) + x3 += x4 + x14 ^= x3 + x14 = (x14 << 16) | (x14 >> 16) + x9 += x14 + x4 ^= x9 + x4 = (x4 << 12) | (x4 >> 20) + x3 += x4 + x14 ^= x3 + x14 = (x14 << 8) | (x14 >> 24) + x9 += x14 + x4 ^= x9 + x4 = (x4 << 7) | (x4 >> 25) + } + + x0 += j0 + x1 += j1 + x2 += j2 + x3 += j3 + x4 += j4 + x5 += j5 + x6 += j6 + x7 += j7 + x8 += j8 + x9 += j9 + x10 += j10 + x11 += j11 + x12 += j12 + x13 += j13 + x14 += j14 + x15 += j15 + + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:4], x0) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[4:8], x1) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[8:12], x2) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[12:16], x3) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[16:20], x4) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[20:24], x5) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[24:28], x6) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[28:32], x7) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[32:36], x8) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[36:40], x9) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[40:44], x10) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[44:48], x11) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[48:52], x12) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[52:56], x13) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[56:60], x14) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[60:64], x15) +} + +// XORKeyStream crypts bytes from in to out using the given key and counters. +// In and out must overlap entirely or not at all. Counter contains the raw +// ChaCha20 counter bytes (i.e. block counter followed by nonce). +func XORKeyStream(out, in []byte, counter *[16]byte, key *[32]byte) { + var block [64]byte + var counterCopy [16]byte + copy(counterCopy[:], counter[:]) + + for len(in) >= 64 { + core(&block, &counterCopy, key) + for i, x := range block { + out[i] = in[i] ^ x + } + u := uint32(1) + for i := 0; i < 4; i++ { + u += uint32(counterCopy[i]) + counterCopy[i] = byte(u) + u >>= 8 + } + in = in[64:] + out = out[64:] + } + + if len(in) > 0 { + core(&block, &counterCopy, key) + for i, v := range in { + out[i] = v ^ block[i] + } + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f562fa571 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +/* +Package poly1305 implements Poly1305 one-time message authentication code as +specified in https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf. + +Poly1305 is a fast, one-time authentication function. It is infeasible for an +attacker to generate an authenticator for a message without the key. However, a +key must only be used for a single message. Authenticating two different +messages with the same key allows an attacker to forge authenticators for other +messages with the same key. + +Poly1305 was originally coupled with AES in order to make Poly1305-AES. AES was +used with a fixed key in order to generate one-time keys from an nonce. +However, in this package AES isn't used and the one-time key is specified +directly. +*/ +package poly1305 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305" + +import "crypto/subtle" + +// TagSize is the size, in bytes, of a poly1305 authenticator. +const TagSize = 16 + +// Verify returns true if mac is a valid authenticator for m with the given +// key. +func Verify(mac *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) bool { + var tmp [16]byte + Sum(&tmp, m, key) + return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(tmp[:], mac[:]) == 1 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4dd72fe79 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine + +package poly1305 + +// This function is implemented in sum_amd64.s +//go:noescape +func poly1305(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte) + +// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the +// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same +// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will. +func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { + var mPtr *byte + if len(m) > 0 { + mPtr = &m[0] + } + poly1305(out, mPtr, uint64(len(m)), key) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.s new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2edae6382 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.s @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine + +#include "textflag.h" + +#define POLY1305_ADD(msg, h0, h1, h2) \ + ADDQ 0(msg), h0; \ + ADCQ 8(msg), h1; \ + ADCQ $1, h2; \ + LEAQ 16(msg), msg + +#define POLY1305_MUL(h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, t0, t1, t2, t3) \ + MOVQ r0, AX; \ + MULQ h0; \ + MOVQ AX, t0; \ + MOVQ DX, t1; \ + MOVQ r0, AX; \ + MULQ h1; \ + ADDQ AX, t1; \ + ADCQ $0, DX; \ + MOVQ r0, t2; \ + IMULQ h2, t2; \ + ADDQ DX, t2; \ + \ + MOVQ r1, AX; \ + MULQ h0; \ + ADDQ AX, t1; \ + ADCQ $0, DX; \ + MOVQ DX, h0; \ + MOVQ r1, t3; \ + IMULQ h2, t3; \ + MOVQ r1, AX; \ + MULQ h1; \ + ADDQ AX, t2; \ + ADCQ DX, t3; \ + ADDQ h0, t2; \ + ADCQ $0, t3; \ + \ + MOVQ t0, h0; \ + MOVQ t1, h1; \ + MOVQ t2, h2; \ + ANDQ $3, h2; \ + MOVQ t2, t0; \ + ANDQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC, t0; \ + ADDQ t0, h0; \ + ADCQ t3, h1; \ + ADCQ $0, h2; \ + SHRQ $2, t3, t2; \ + SHRQ $2, t3; \ + ADDQ t2, h0; \ + ADCQ t3, h1; \ + ADCQ $0, h2 + +DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF +DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC +GLOBL ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), RODATA, $16 + +// func poly1305(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]key) +TEXT ·poly1305(SB), $0-32 + MOVQ out+0(FP), DI + MOVQ m+8(FP), SI + MOVQ mlen+16(FP), R15 + MOVQ key+24(FP), AX + + MOVQ 0(AX), R11 + MOVQ 8(AX), R12 + ANDQ ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), R11 // r0 + ANDQ ·poly1305Mask<>+8(SB), R12 // r1 + XORQ R8, R8 // h0 + XORQ R9, R9 // h1 + XORQ R10, R10 // h2 + + CMPQ R15, $16 + JB bytes_between_0_and_15 + +loop: + POLY1305_ADD(SI, R8, R9, R10) + +multiply: + POLY1305_MUL(R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, BX, CX, R13, R14) + SUBQ $16, R15 + CMPQ R15, $16 + JAE loop + +bytes_between_0_and_15: + TESTQ R15, R15 + JZ done + MOVQ $1, BX + XORQ CX, CX + XORQ R13, R13 + ADDQ R15, SI + +flush_buffer: + SHLQ $8, BX, CX + SHLQ $8, BX + MOVB -1(SI), R13 + XORQ R13, BX + DECQ SI + DECQ R15 + JNZ flush_buffer + + ADDQ BX, R8 + ADCQ CX, R9 + ADCQ $0, R10 + MOVQ $16, R15 + JMP multiply + +done: + MOVQ R8, AX + MOVQ R9, BX + SUBQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFB, AX + SBBQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, BX + SBBQ $3, R10 + CMOVQCS R8, AX + CMOVQCS R9, BX + MOVQ key+24(FP), R8 + ADDQ 16(R8), AX + ADCQ 24(R8), BX + + MOVQ AX, 0(DI) + MOVQ BX, 8(DI) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5dc321c2f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.go @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build arm,!gccgo,!appengine,!nacl + +package poly1305 + +// This function is implemented in sum_arm.s +//go:noescape +func poly1305_auth_armv6(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint32, key *[32]byte) + +// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the +// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same +// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will. +func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { + var mPtr *byte + if len(m) > 0 { + mPtr = &m[0] + } + poly1305_auth_armv6(out, mPtr, uint32(len(m)), key) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.s new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f70b4ac48 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.s @@ -0,0 +1,427 @@ +// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build arm,!gccgo,!appengine,!nacl + +#include "textflag.h" + +// This code was translated into a form compatible with 5a from the public +// domain source by Andrew Moon: github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-opt/blob/master/app/extensions/poly1305. + +DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x3ffffff +DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0x3ffff03 +DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x3ffc0ff +DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x3f03fff +DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x10(SB)/4, $0x00fffff +GLOBL ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>(SB), 8, $20 + +// Warning: the linker may use R11 to synthesize certain instructions. Please +// take care and verify that no synthetic instructions use it. + +TEXT poly1305_init_ext_armv6<>(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 + // Needs 16 bytes of stack and 64 bytes of space pointed to by R0. (It + // might look like it's only 60 bytes of space but the final four bytes + // will be written by another function.) We need to skip over four + // bytes of stack because that's saving the value of 'g'. + ADD $4, R13, R8 + MOVM.IB [R4-R7], (R8) + MOVM.IA.W (R1), [R2-R5] + MOVW $·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>(SB), R7 + MOVW R2, R8 + MOVW R2>>26, R9 + MOVW R3>>20, g + MOVW R4>>14, R11 + MOVW R5>>8, R12 + ORR R3<<6, R9, R9 + ORR R4<<12, g, g + ORR R5<<18, R11, R11 + MOVM.IA (R7), [R2-R6] + AND R8, R2, R2 + AND R9, R3, R3 + AND g, R4, R4 + AND R11, R5, R5 + AND R12, R6, R6 + MOVM.IA.W [R2-R6], (R0) + EOR R2, R2, R2 + EOR R3, R3, R3 + EOR R4, R4, R4 + EOR R5, R5, R5 + EOR R6, R6, R6 + MOVM.IA.W [R2-R6], (R0) + MOVM.IA.W (R1), [R2-R5] + MOVM.IA [R2-R6], (R0) + ADD $20, R13, R0 + MOVM.DA (R0), [R4-R7] + RET + +#define MOVW_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp, offset) \ + MOVBU (offset+0)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \ + MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+0)(Rdst); \ + MOVBU (offset+1)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \ + MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+1)(Rdst); \ + MOVBU (offset+2)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \ + MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+2)(Rdst); \ + MOVBU (offset+3)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \ + MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+3)(Rdst) + +TEXT poly1305_blocks_armv6<>(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 + // Needs 24 bytes of stack for saved registers and then 88 bytes of + // scratch space after that. We assume that 24 bytes at (R13) have + // already been used: four bytes for the link register saved in the + // prelude of poly1305_auth_armv6, four bytes for saving the value of g + // in that function and 16 bytes of scratch space used around + // poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip1. + ADD $24, R13, R12 + MOVM.IB [R4-R8, R14], (R12) + MOVW R0, 88(R13) + MOVW R1, 92(R13) + MOVW R2, 96(R13) + MOVW R1, R14 + MOVW R2, R12 + MOVW 56(R0), R8 + WORD $0xe1180008 // TST R8, R8 not working see issue 5921 + EOR R6, R6, R6 + MOVW.EQ $(1<<24), R6 + MOVW R6, 84(R13) + ADD $116, R13, g + MOVM.IA (R0), [R0-R9] + MOVM.IA [R0-R4], (g) + CMP $16, R12 + BLO poly1305_blocks_armv6_done + +poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop: + WORD $0xe31e0003 // TST R14, #3 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_aligned + ADD $100, R13, g + MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 0) + MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 4) + MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 8) + MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 12) + MOVM.IA (g), [R0-R3] + ADD $16, R14 + B poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_loaded + +poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_aligned: + MOVM.IA.W (R14), [R0-R3] + +poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_loaded: + MOVW R0>>26, g + MOVW R1>>20, R11 + MOVW R2>>14, R12 + MOVW R14, 92(R13) + MOVW R3>>8, R4 + ORR R1<<6, g, g + ORR R2<<12, R11, R11 + ORR R3<<18, R12, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R0, R0 + BIC $0xfc000000, g, g + MOVW 84(R13), R3 + BIC $0xfc000000, R11, R11 + BIC $0xfc000000, R12, R12 + ADD R0, R5, R5 + ADD g, R6, R6 + ORR R3, R4, R4 + ADD R11, R7, R7 + ADD $116, R13, R14 + ADD R12, R8, R8 + ADD R4, R9, R9 + MOVM.IA (R14), [R0-R4] + MULLU R4, R5, (R11, g) + MULLU R3, R5, (R14, R12) + MULALU R3, R6, (R11, g) + MULALU R2, R6, (R14, R12) + MULALU R2, R7, (R11, g) + MULALU R1, R7, (R14, R12) + ADD R4<<2, R4, R4 + ADD R3<<2, R3, R3 + MULALU R1, R8, (R11, g) + MULALU R0, R8, (R14, R12) + MULALU R0, R9, (R11, g) + MULALU R4, R9, (R14, R12) + MOVW g, 76(R13) + MOVW R11, 80(R13) + MOVW R12, 68(R13) + MOVW R14, 72(R13) + MULLU R2, R5, (R11, g) + MULLU R1, R5, (R14, R12) + MULALU R1, R6, (R11, g) + MULALU R0, R6, (R14, R12) + MULALU R0, R7, (R11, g) + MULALU R4, R7, (R14, R12) + ADD R2<<2, R2, R2 + ADD R1<<2, R1, R1 + MULALU R4, R8, (R11, g) + MULALU R3, R8, (R14, R12) + MULALU R3, R9, (R11, g) + MULALU R2, R9, (R14, R12) + MOVW g, 60(R13) + MOVW R11, 64(R13) + MOVW R12, 52(R13) + MOVW R14, 56(R13) + MULLU R0, R5, (R11, g) + MULALU R4, R6, (R11, g) + MULALU R3, R7, (R11, g) + MULALU R2, R8, (R11, g) + MULALU R1, R9, (R11, g) + ADD $52, R13, R0 + MOVM.IA (R0), [R0-R7] + MOVW g>>26, R12 + MOVW R4>>26, R14 + ORR R11<<6, R12, R12 + ORR R5<<6, R14, R14 + BIC $0xfc000000, g, g + BIC $0xfc000000, R4, R4 + ADD.S R12, R0, R0 + ADC $0, R1, R1 + ADD.S R14, R6, R6 + ADC $0, R7, R7 + MOVW R0>>26, R12 + MOVW R6>>26, R14 + ORR R1<<6, R12, R12 + ORR R7<<6, R14, R14 + BIC $0xfc000000, R0, R0 + BIC $0xfc000000, R6, R6 + ADD R14<<2, R14, R14 + ADD.S R12, R2, R2 + ADC $0, R3, R3 + ADD R14, g, g + MOVW R2>>26, R12 + MOVW g>>26, R14 + ORR R3<<6, R12, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, g, R5 + BIC $0xfc000000, R2, R7 + ADD R12, R4, R4 + ADD R14, R0, R0 + MOVW R4>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R4, R8 + ADD R12, R6, R9 + MOVW 96(R13), R12 + MOVW 92(R13), R14 + MOVW R0, R6 + CMP $32, R12 + SUB $16, R12, R12 + MOVW R12, 96(R13) + BHS poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop + +poly1305_blocks_armv6_done: + MOVW 88(R13), R12 + MOVW R5, 20(R12) + MOVW R6, 24(R12) + MOVW R7, 28(R12) + MOVW R8, 32(R12) + MOVW R9, 36(R12) + ADD $48, R13, R0 + MOVM.DA (R0), [R4-R8, R14] + RET + +#define MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp) \ + MOVBU.P 1(Rsrc), Rtmp; \ + MOVBU.P Rtmp, 1(Rdst); \ + MOVBU.P 1(Rsrc), Rtmp; \ + MOVBU.P Rtmp, 1(Rdst) + +#define MOVWP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp) \ + MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp); \ + MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp) + +// func poly1305_auth_armv6(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint32, key *[32]key) +TEXT ·poly1305_auth_armv6(SB), $196-16 + // The value 196, just above, is the sum of 64 (the size of the context + // structure) and 132 (the amount of stack needed). + // + // At this point, the stack pointer (R13) has been moved down. It + // points to the saved link register and there's 196 bytes of free + // space above it. + // + // The stack for this function looks like: + // + // +--------------------- + // | + // | 64 bytes of context structure + // | + // +--------------------- + // | + // | 112 bytes for poly1305_blocks_armv6 + // | + // +--------------------- + // | 16 bytes of final block, constructed at + // | poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8 + // +--------------------- + // | four bytes of saved 'g' + // +--------------------- + // | lr, saved by prelude <- R13 points here + // +--------------------- + MOVW g, 4(R13) + + MOVW out+0(FP), R4 + MOVW m+4(FP), R5 + MOVW mlen+8(FP), R6 + MOVW key+12(FP), R7 + + ADD $136, R13, R0 // 136 = 4 + 4 + 16 + 112 + MOVW R7, R1 + + // poly1305_init_ext_armv6 will write to the stack from R13+4, but + // that's ok because none of the other values have been written yet. + BL poly1305_init_ext_armv6<>(SB) + BIC.S $15, R6, R2 + BEQ poly1305_auth_armv6_noblocks + ADD $136, R13, R0 + MOVW R5, R1 + ADD R2, R5, R5 + SUB R2, R6, R6 + BL poly1305_blocks_armv6<>(SB) + +poly1305_auth_armv6_noblocks: + ADD $136, R13, R0 + MOVW R5, R1 + MOVW R6, R2 + MOVW R4, R3 + + MOVW R0, R5 + MOVW R1, R6 + MOVW R2, R7 + MOVW R3, R8 + AND.S R2, R2, R2 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_noremaining + EOR R0, R0 + ADD $8, R13, R9 // 8 = offset to 16 byte scratch space + MOVW R0, (R9) + MOVW R0, 4(R9) + MOVW R0, 8(R9) + MOVW R0, 12(R9) + WORD $0xe3110003 // TST R1, #3 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_aligned + WORD $0xe3120008 // TST R2, #8 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8 + MOVWP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g) + MOVWP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g) + +poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8: + WORD $0xe3120004 // TST $4, R2 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4 + MOVWP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g) + +poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4: + WORD $0xe3120002 // TST $2, R2 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2 + MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g) + B poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2 + +poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_aligned: + WORD $0xe3120008 // TST R2, #8 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8_aligned + MOVM.IA.W (R1), [g-R11] + MOVM.IA.W [g-R11], (R9) + +poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8_aligned: + WORD $0xe3120004 // TST $4, R2 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4_aligned + MOVW.P 4(R1), g + MOVW.P g, 4(R9) + +poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4_aligned: + WORD $0xe3120002 // TST $2, R2 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2 + MOVHU.P 2(R1), g + MOVH.P g, 2(R9) + +poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2: + WORD $0xe3120001 // TST $1, R2 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip1 + MOVBU.P 1(R1), g + MOVBU.P g, 1(R9) + +poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip1: + MOVW $1, R11 + MOVBU R11, 0(R9) + MOVW R11, 56(R5) + MOVW R5, R0 + ADD $8, R13, R1 + MOVW $16, R2 + BL poly1305_blocks_armv6<>(SB) + +poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_noremaining: + MOVW 20(R5), R0 + MOVW 24(R5), R1 + MOVW 28(R5), R2 + MOVW 32(R5), R3 + MOVW 36(R5), R4 + MOVW R4>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R4, R4 + ADD R12<<2, R12, R12 + ADD R12, R0, R0 + MOVW R0>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R0, R0 + ADD R12, R1, R1 + MOVW R1>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R1, R1 + ADD R12, R2, R2 + MOVW R2>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R2, R2 + ADD R12, R3, R3 + MOVW R3>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R3, R3 + ADD R12, R4, R4 + ADD $5, R0, R6 + MOVW R6>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R6, R6 + ADD R12, R1, R7 + MOVW R7>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R7, R7 + ADD R12, R2, g + MOVW g>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, g, g + ADD R12, R3, R11 + MOVW $-(1<<26), R12 + ADD R11>>26, R12, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R11, R11 + ADD R12, R4, R9 + MOVW R9>>31, R12 + SUB $1, R12 + AND R12, R6, R6 + AND R12, R7, R7 + AND R12, g, g + AND R12, R11, R11 + AND R12, R9, R9 + MVN R12, R12 + AND R12, R0, R0 + AND R12, R1, R1 + AND R12, R2, R2 + AND R12, R3, R3 + AND R12, R4, R4 + ORR R6, R0, R0 + ORR R7, R1, R1 + ORR g, R2, R2 + ORR R11, R3, R3 + ORR R9, R4, R4 + ORR R1<<26, R0, R0 + MOVW R1>>6, R1 + ORR R2<<20, R1, R1 + MOVW R2>>12, R2 + ORR R3<<14, R2, R2 + MOVW R3>>18, R3 + ORR R4<<8, R3, R3 + MOVW 40(R5), R6 + MOVW 44(R5), R7 + MOVW 48(R5), g + MOVW 52(R5), R11 + ADD.S R6, R0, R0 + ADC.S R7, R1, R1 + ADC.S g, R2, R2 + ADC.S R11, R3, R3 + MOVM.IA [R0-R3], (R8) + MOVW R5, R12 + EOR R0, R0, R0 + EOR R1, R1, R1 + EOR R2, R2, R2 + EOR R3, R3, R3 + EOR R4, R4, R4 + EOR R5, R5, R5 + EOR R6, R6, R6 + EOR R7, R7, R7 + MOVM.IA.W [R0-R7], (R12) + MOVM.IA [R0-R7], (R12) + MOVW 4(R13), g + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ref.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ref.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b2805a5ca --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ref.go @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !amd64,!arm gccgo appengine nacl + +package poly1305 + +import "encoding/binary" + +// Sum generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and puts the +// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same +// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will. +func Sum(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) { + var ( + h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 uint32 // the hash accumulators + r0, r1, r2, r3, r4 uint64 // the r part of the key + ) + + r0 = uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:]) & 0x3ffffff) + r1 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03) + r2 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff) + r3 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff) + r4 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:]) >> 8) & 0x00fffff) + + R1, R2, R3, R4 := r1*5, r2*5, r3*5, r4*5 + + for len(msg) >= TagSize { + // h += msg + h0 += binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[0:]) & 0x3ffffff + h1 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff + h2 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff + h3 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff + h4 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[12:]) >> 8) | (1 << 24) + + // h *= r + d0 := (uint64(h0) * r0) + (uint64(h1) * R4) + (uint64(h2) * R3) + (uint64(h3) * R2) + (uint64(h4) * R1) + d1 := (d0 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r1) + (uint64(h1) * r0) + (uint64(h2) * R4) + (uint64(h3) * R3) + (uint64(h4) * R2) + d2 := (d1 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r2) + (uint64(h1) * r1) + (uint64(h2) * r0) + (uint64(h3) * R4) + (uint64(h4) * R3) + d3 := (d2 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r3) + (uint64(h1) * r2) + (uint64(h2) * r1) + (uint64(h3) * r0) + (uint64(h4) * R4) + d4 := (d3 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r4) + (uint64(h1) * r3) + (uint64(h2) * r2) + (uint64(h3) * r1) + (uint64(h4) * r0) + + // h %= p + h0 = uint32(d0) & 0x3ffffff + h1 = uint32(d1) & 0x3ffffff + h2 = uint32(d2) & 0x3ffffff + h3 = uint32(d3) & 0x3ffffff + h4 = uint32(d4) & 0x3ffffff + + h0 += uint32(d4>>26) * 5 + h1 += h0 >> 26 + h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff + + msg = msg[TagSize:] + } + + if len(msg) > 0 { + var block [TagSize]byte + off := copy(block[:], msg) + block[off] = 0x01 + + // h += msg + h0 += binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[0:]) & 0x3ffffff + h1 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff + h2 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff + h3 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff + h4 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[12:]) >> 8) + + // h *= r + d0 := (uint64(h0) * r0) + (uint64(h1) * R4) + (uint64(h2) * R3) + (uint64(h3) * R2) + (uint64(h4) * R1) + d1 := (d0 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r1) + (uint64(h1) * r0) + (uint64(h2) * R4) + (uint64(h3) * R3) + (uint64(h4) * R2) + d2 := (d1 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r2) + (uint64(h1) * r1) + (uint64(h2) * r0) + (uint64(h3) * R4) + (uint64(h4) * R3) + d3 := (d2 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r3) + (uint64(h1) * r2) + (uint64(h2) * r1) + (uint64(h3) * r0) + (uint64(h4) * R4) + d4 := (d3 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r4) + (uint64(h1) * r3) + (uint64(h2) * r2) + (uint64(h3) * r1) + (uint64(h4) * r0) + + // h %= p + h0 = uint32(d0) & 0x3ffffff + h1 = uint32(d1) & 0x3ffffff + h2 = uint32(d2) & 0x3ffffff + h3 = uint32(d3) & 0x3ffffff + h4 = uint32(d4) & 0x3ffffff + + h0 += uint32(d4>>26) * 5 + h1 += h0 >> 26 + h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff + } + + // h %= p reduction + h2 += h1 >> 26 + h1 &= 0x3ffffff + h3 += h2 >> 26 + h2 &= 0x3ffffff + h4 += h3 >> 26 + h3 &= 0x3ffffff + h0 += 5 * (h4 >> 26) + h4 &= 0x3ffffff + h1 += h0 >> 26 + h0 &= 0x3ffffff + + // h - p + t0 := h0 + 5 + t1 := h1 + (t0 >> 26) + t2 := h2 + (t1 >> 26) + t3 := h3 + (t2 >> 26) + t4 := h4 + (t3 >> 26) - (1 << 26) + t0 &= 0x3ffffff + t1 &= 0x3ffffff + t2 &= 0x3ffffff + t3 &= 0x3ffffff + + // select h if h < p else h - p + t_mask := (t4 >> 31) - 1 + h_mask := ^t_mask + h0 = (h0 & h_mask) | (t0 & t_mask) + h1 = (h1 & h_mask) | (t1 & t_mask) + h2 = (h2 & h_mask) | (t2 & t_mask) + h3 = (h3 & h_mask) | (t3 & t_mask) + h4 = (h4 & h_mask) | (t4 & t_mask) + + // h %= 2^128 + h0 |= h1 << 26 + h1 = ((h1 >> 6) | (h2 << 20)) + h2 = ((h2 >> 12) | (h3 << 14)) + h3 = ((h3 >> 18) | (h4 << 8)) + + // s: the s part of the key + // tag = (h + s) % (2^128) + t := uint64(h0) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:])) + h0 = uint32(t) + t = uint64(h1) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:])) + (t >> 32) + h1 = uint32(t) + t = uint64(h2) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:])) + (t >> 32) + h2 = uint32(t) + t = uint64(h3) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:])) + (t >> 32) + h3 = uint32(t) + + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:], h0) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[4:], h1) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[8:], h2) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[12:], h3) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go index 5c9fadcee..42106f3f2 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go @@ -44,7 +44,9 @@ type Signature struct { const CertTimeInfinity = 1<<64 - 1 // An Certificate represents an OpenSSH certificate as defined in -// [PROTOCOL.certkeys]?rev=1.8. +// [PROTOCOL.certkeys]?rev=1.8. The Certificate type implements the +// PublicKey interface, so it can be unmarshaled using +// ParsePublicKey. type Certificate struct { Nonce []byte Key PublicKey @@ -340,7 +342,7 @@ func (c *CertChecker) Authenticate(conn ConnMetadata, pubKey PublicKey) (*Permis // the signature of the certificate. func (c *CertChecker) CheckCert(principal string, cert *Certificate) error { if c.IsRevoked != nil && c.IsRevoked(cert) { - return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certicate serial %d revoked", cert.Serial) + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate serial %d revoked", cert.Serial) } for opt := range cert.CriticalOptions { diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go index e67c5e0aa..30a49fdf2 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go @@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ import ( "hash" "io" "io/ioutil" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20" + "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305" ) const ( @@ -53,78 +56,78 @@ func newRC4(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) { return rc4.NewCipher(key) } -type streamCipherMode struct { - keySize int - ivSize int - skip int - createFunc func(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) +type cipherMode struct { + keySize int + ivSize int + create func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) } -func (c *streamCipherMode) createStream(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) { - if len(key) < c.keySize { - panic("ssh: key length too small for cipher") - } - if len(iv) < c.ivSize { - panic("ssh: iv too small for cipher") - } - - stream, err := c.createFunc(key[:c.keySize], iv[:c.ivSize]) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - var streamDump []byte - if c.skip > 0 { - streamDump = make([]byte, 512) - } - - for remainingToDump := c.skip; remainingToDump > 0; { - dumpThisTime := remainingToDump - if dumpThisTime > len(streamDump) { - dumpThisTime = len(streamDump) +func streamCipherMode(skip int, createFunc func(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error)) func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + return func(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + stream, err := createFunc(key, iv) + if err != nil { + return nil, err } - stream.XORKeyStream(streamDump[:dumpThisTime], streamDump[:dumpThisTime]) - remainingToDump -= dumpThisTime - } - return stream, nil + var streamDump []byte + if skip > 0 { + streamDump = make([]byte, 512) + } + + for remainingToDump := skip; remainingToDump > 0; { + dumpThisTime := remainingToDump + if dumpThisTime > len(streamDump) { + dumpThisTime = len(streamDump) + } + stream.XORKeyStream(streamDump[:dumpThisTime], streamDump[:dumpThisTime]) + remainingToDump -= dumpThisTime + } + + mac := macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey) + return &streamPacketCipher{ + mac: mac, + etm: macModes[algs.MAC].etm, + macResult: make([]byte, mac.Size()), + cipher: stream, + }, nil + } } // cipherModes documents properties of supported ciphers. Ciphers not included // are not supported and will not be negotiated, even if explicitly requested in // ClientConfig.Crypto.Ciphers. -var cipherModes = map[string]*streamCipherMode{ +var cipherModes = map[string]*cipherMode{ // Ciphers from RFC4344, which introduced many CTR-based ciphers. Algorithms // are defined in the order specified in the RFC. - "aes128-ctr": {16, aes.BlockSize, 0, newAESCTR}, - "aes192-ctr": {24, aes.BlockSize, 0, newAESCTR}, - "aes256-ctr": {32, aes.BlockSize, 0, newAESCTR}, + "aes128-ctr": {16, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)}, + "aes192-ctr": {24, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)}, + "aes256-ctr": {32, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)}, // Ciphers from RFC4345, which introduces security-improved arcfour ciphers. // They are defined in the order specified in the RFC. - "arcfour128": {16, 0, 1536, newRC4}, - "arcfour256": {32, 0, 1536, newRC4}, + "arcfour128": {16, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)}, + "arcfour256": {32, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)}, // Cipher defined in RFC 4253, which describes SSH Transport Layer Protocol. // Note that this cipher is not safe, as stated in RFC 4253: "Arcfour (and // RC4) has problems with weak keys, and should be used with caution." // RFC4345 introduces improved versions of Arcfour. - "arcfour": {16, 0, 0, newRC4}, + "arcfour": {16, 0, streamCipherMode(0, newRC4)}, - // AES-GCM is not a stream cipher, so it is constructed with a - // special case. If we add any more non-stream ciphers, we - // should invest a cleaner way to do this. - gcmCipherID: {16, 12, 0, nil}, + // AEAD ciphers + gcmCipherID: {16, 12, newGCMCipher}, + chacha20Poly1305ID: {64, 0, newChaCha20Cipher}, // CBC mode is insecure and so is not included in the default config. // (See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/SandPfinal.pdf). If absolutely // needed, it's possible to specify a custom Config to enable it. // You should expect that an active attacker can recover plaintext if // you do. - aes128cbcID: {16, aes.BlockSize, 0, nil}, + aes128cbcID: {16, aes.BlockSize, newAESCBCCipher}, - // 3des-cbc is insecure and is disabled by default. - tripledescbcID: {24, des.BlockSize, 0, nil}, + // 3des-cbc is insecure and is not included in the default + // config. + tripledescbcID: {24, des.BlockSize, newTripleDESCBCCipher}, } // prefixLen is the length of the packet prefix that contains the packet length @@ -304,7 +307,7 @@ type gcmCipher struct { buf []byte } -func newGCMCipher(iv, key []byte) (packetCipher, error) { +func newGCMCipher(key, iv, unusedMacKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { c, err := aes.NewCipher(key) if err != nil { return nil, err @@ -422,7 +425,7 @@ type cbcCipher struct { oracleCamouflage uint32 } -func newCBCCipher(c cipher.Block, iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { +func newCBCCipher(c cipher.Block, key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { cbc := &cbcCipher{ mac: macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey), decrypter: cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(c, iv), @@ -436,13 +439,13 @@ func newCBCCipher(c cipher.Block, iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorith return cbc, nil } -func newAESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { +func newAESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { c, err := aes.NewCipher(key) if err != nil { return nil, err } - cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, iv, key, macKey, algs) + cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, key, iv, macKey, algs) if err != nil { return nil, err } @@ -450,13 +453,13 @@ func newAESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCi return cbc, nil } -func newTripleDESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { +func newTripleDESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { c, err := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key) if err != nil { return nil, err } - cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, iv, key, macKey, algs) + cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, key, iv, macKey, algs) if err != nil { return nil, err } @@ -627,3 +630,142 @@ func (c *cbcCipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, pack return nil } + +const chacha20Poly1305ID = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" + +// chacha20Poly1305Cipher implements the chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com +// AEAD, which is described here: +// +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-ssh-chacha20-poly1305-openssh-00 +// +// the methods here also implement padding, which RFC4253 Section 6 +// also requires of stream ciphers. +type chacha20Poly1305Cipher struct { + lengthKey [32]byte + contentKey [32]byte + buf []byte +} + +func newChaCha20Cipher(key, unusedIV, unusedMACKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + if len(key) != 64 { + panic(len(key)) + } + + c := &chacha20Poly1305Cipher{ + buf: make([]byte, 256), + } + + copy(c.contentKey[:], key[:32]) + copy(c.lengthKey[:], key[32:]) + return c, nil +} + +// The Poly1305 key is obtained by encrypting 32 0-bytes. +var chacha20PolyKeyInput [32]byte + +func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + var counter [16]byte + binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(counter[8:], uint64(seqNum)) + + var polyKey [32]byte + chacha20.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], chacha20PolyKeyInput[:], &counter, &c.contentKey) + + encryptedLength := c.buf[:4] + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, encryptedLength); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var lenBytes [4]byte + chacha20.XORKeyStream(lenBytes[:], encryptedLength, &counter, &c.lengthKey) + + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(lenBytes[:]) + if length > maxPacket { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid packet length, packet too large") + } + + contentEnd := 4 + length + packetEnd := contentEnd + poly1305.TagSize + if uint32(cap(c.buf)) < packetEnd { + c.buf = make([]byte, packetEnd) + copy(c.buf[:], encryptedLength) + } else { + c.buf = c.buf[:packetEnd] + } + + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.buf[4:packetEnd]); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var mac [poly1305.TagSize]byte + copy(mac[:], c.buf[contentEnd:packetEnd]) + if !poly1305.Verify(&mac, c.buf[:contentEnd], &polyKey) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: MAC failure") + } + + counter[0] = 1 + + plain := c.buf[4:contentEnd] + chacha20.XORKeyStream(plain, plain, &counter, &c.contentKey) + + padding := plain[0] + if padding < 4 { + // padding is a byte, so it automatically satisfies + // the maximum size, which is 255. + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: illegal padding %d", padding) + } + + if int(padding)+1 >= len(plain) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: padding %d too large", padding) + } + + plain = plain[1 : len(plain)-int(padding)] + + return plain, nil +} + +func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, payload []byte) error { + var counter [16]byte + binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(counter[8:], uint64(seqNum)) + + var polyKey [32]byte + chacha20.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], chacha20PolyKeyInput[:], &counter, &c.contentKey) + + // There is no blocksize, so fall back to multiple of 8 byte + // padding, as described in RFC 4253, Sec 6. + const packetSizeMultiple = 8 + + padding := packetSizeMultiple - (1+len(payload))%packetSizeMultiple + if padding < 4 { + padding += packetSizeMultiple + } + + // size (4 bytes), padding (1), payload, padding, tag. + totalLength := 4 + 1 + len(payload) + padding + poly1305.TagSize + if cap(c.buf) < totalLength { + c.buf = make([]byte, totalLength) + } else { + c.buf = c.buf[:totalLength] + } + + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.buf, uint32(1+len(payload)+padding)) + chacha20.XORKeyStream(c.buf, c.buf[:4], &counter, &c.lengthKey) + c.buf[4] = byte(padding) + copy(c.buf[5:], payload) + packetEnd := 5 + len(payload) + padding + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.buf[5+len(payload):packetEnd]); err != nil { + return err + } + + counter[0] = 1 + chacha20.XORKeyStream(c.buf[4:], c.buf[4:packetEnd], &counter, &c.contentKey) + + var mac [poly1305.TagSize]byte + poly1305.Sum(&mac, c.buf[:packetEnd], &polyKey) + + copy(c.buf[packetEnd:], mac[:]) + + if _, err := w.Write(c.buf); err != nil { + return err + } + return nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go index a1252cb9b..5f44b7740 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go @@ -11,6 +11,14 @@ import ( "io" ) +type authResult int + +const ( + authFailure authResult = iota + authPartialSuccess + authSuccess +) + // clientAuthenticate authenticates with the remote server. See RFC 4252. func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error { // initiate user auth session @@ -37,11 +45,12 @@ func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error { if err != nil { return err } - if ok { + if ok == authSuccess { // success return nil + } else if ok == authFailure { + tried[auth.method()] = true } - tried[auth.method()] = true if methods == nil { methods = lastMethods } @@ -82,7 +91,7 @@ type AuthMethod interface { // If authentication is not successful, a []string of alternative // method names is returned. If the slice is nil, it will be ignored // and the previous set of possible methods will be reused. - auth(session []byte, user string, p packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error) + auth(session []byte, user string, p packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) // method returns the RFC 4252 method name. method() string @@ -91,13 +100,13 @@ type AuthMethod interface { // "none" authentication, RFC 4252 section 5.2. type noneAuth int -func (n *noneAuth) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error) { +func (n *noneAuth) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) { if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthRequestMsg{ User: user, Service: serviceSSH, Method: "none", })); err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } return handleAuthResponse(c) @@ -111,7 +120,7 @@ func (n *noneAuth) method() string { // a function call, e.g. by prompting the user. type passwordCallback func() (password string, err error) -func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error) { +func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) { type passwordAuthMsg struct { User string `sshtype:"50"` Service string @@ -125,7 +134,7 @@ func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand // The program may only find out that the user doesn't have a password // when prompting. if err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&passwordAuthMsg{ @@ -135,7 +144,7 @@ func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand Reply: false, Password: pw, })); err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } return handleAuthResponse(c) @@ -178,7 +187,7 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) method() string { return "publickey" } -func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error) { +func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) { // Authentication is performed by sending an enquiry to test if a key is // acceptable to the remote. If the key is acceptable, the client will // attempt to authenticate with the valid key. If not the client will repeat @@ -186,13 +195,13 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand signers, err := cb() if err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } var methods []string for _, signer := range signers { ok, err := validateKey(signer.PublicKey(), user, c) if err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } if !ok { continue @@ -206,7 +215,7 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand Method: cb.method(), }, []byte(pub.Type()), pubKey)) if err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } // manually wrap the serialized signature in a string @@ -224,24 +233,24 @@ func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand } p := Marshal(&msg) if err := c.writePacket(p); err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } - var success bool + var success authResult success, methods, err = handleAuthResponse(c) if err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } // If authentication succeeds or the list of available methods does not // contain the "publickey" method, do not attempt to authenticate with any // other keys. According to RFC 4252 Section 7, the latter can occur when // additional authentication methods are required. - if success || !containsMethod(methods, cb.method()) { + if success == authSuccess || !containsMethod(methods, cb.method()) { return success, methods, err } } - return false, methods, nil + return authFailure, methods, nil } func containsMethod(methods []string, method string) bool { @@ -318,28 +327,31 @@ func PublicKeysCallback(getSigners func() (signers []Signer, err error)) AuthMet // handleAuthResponse returns whether the preceding authentication request succeeded // along with a list of remaining authentication methods to try next and // an error if an unexpected response was received. -func handleAuthResponse(c packetConn) (bool, []string, error) { +func handleAuthResponse(c packetConn) (authResult, []string, error) { for { packet, err := c.readPacket() if err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } switch packet[0] { case msgUserAuthBanner: if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } case msgUserAuthFailure: var msg userAuthFailureMsg if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } - return false, msg.Methods, nil + if msg.PartialSuccess { + return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil + } + return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil case msgUserAuthSuccess: - return true, nil, nil + return authSuccess, nil, nil default: - return false, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0]) + return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0]) } } } @@ -381,7 +393,7 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) method() string { return "keyboard-interactive" } -func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error) { +func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) { type initiateMsg struct { User string `sshtype:"50"` Service string @@ -395,20 +407,20 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packe Service: serviceSSH, Method: "keyboard-interactive", })); err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } for { packet, err := c.readPacket() if err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } // like handleAuthResponse, but with less options. switch packet[0] { case msgUserAuthBanner: if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } continue case msgUserAuthInfoRequest: @@ -416,18 +428,21 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packe case msgUserAuthFailure: var msg userAuthFailureMsg if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } - return false, msg.Methods, nil + if msg.PartialSuccess { + return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil + } + return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil case msgUserAuthSuccess: - return true, nil, nil + return authSuccess, nil, nil default: - return false, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoRequest, packet[0]) + return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoRequest, packet[0]) } var msg userAuthInfoRequestMsg if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } // Manually unpack the prompt/echo pairs. @@ -437,7 +452,7 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packe for i := 0; i < int(msg.NumPrompts); i++ { prompt, r, ok := parseString(rest) if !ok || len(r) == 0 { - return false, nil, errors.New("ssh: prompt format error") + return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: prompt format error") } prompts = append(prompts, string(prompt)) echos = append(echos, r[0] != 0) @@ -445,16 +460,16 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packe } if len(rest) != 0 { - return false, nil, errors.New("ssh: extra data following keyboard-interactive pairs") + return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: extra data following keyboard-interactive pairs") } answers, err := cb(msg.User, msg.Instruction, prompts, echos) if err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } if len(answers) != len(prompts) { - return false, nil, errors.New("ssh: not enough answers from keyboard-interactive callback") + return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: not enough answers from keyboard-interactive callback") } responseLength := 1 + 4 for _, a := range answers { @@ -470,7 +485,7 @@ func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packe } if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil { - return false, nil, err + return authFailure, nil, err } } } @@ -480,10 +495,10 @@ type retryableAuthMethod struct { maxTries int } -func (r *retryableAuthMethod) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (ok bool, methods []string, err error) { +func (r *retryableAuthMethod) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (ok authResult, methods []string, err error) { for i := 0; r.maxTries <= 0 || i < r.maxTries; i++ { ok, methods, err = r.authMethod.auth(session, user, c, rand) - if ok || err != nil { // either success or error terminate + if ok != authFailure || err != nil { // either success, partial success or error terminate return ok, methods, err } } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go index 135b4edd7..04f3620b3 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go @@ -24,11 +24,21 @@ const ( serviceSSH = "ssh-connection" ) -// supportedCiphers specifies the supported ciphers in preference order. +// supportedCiphers lists ciphers we support but might not recommend. var supportedCiphers = []string{ "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr", "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", - "arcfour256", "arcfour128", + chacha20Poly1305ID, + "arcfour256", "arcfour128", "arcfour", + aes128cbcID, + tripledescbcID, +} + +// preferredCiphers specifies the default preference for ciphers. +var preferredCiphers = []string{ + "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", + chacha20Poly1305ID, + "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr", } // supportedKexAlgos specifies the supported key-exchange algorithms in @@ -211,7 +221,7 @@ func (c *Config) SetDefaults() { c.Rand = rand.Reader } if c.Ciphers == nil { - c.Ciphers = supportedCiphers + c.Ciphers = preferredCiphers } var ciphers []string for _, c := range c.Ciphers { diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts/knownhosts.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts/knownhosts.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..46dad1401 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts/knownhosts.go @@ -0,0 +1,546 @@ +// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package knownhosts implements a parser for the OpenSSH +// known_hosts host key database. +package knownhosts + +import ( + "bufio" + "bytes" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/sha1" + "encoding/base64" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "os" + "strings" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh" +) + +// See the sshd manpage +// (http://man.openbsd.org/sshd#SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS_FILE_FORMAT) for +// background. + +type addr struct{ host, port string } + +func (a *addr) String() string { + h := a.host + if strings.Contains(h, ":") { + h = "[" + h + "]" + } + return h + ":" + a.port +} + +type matcher interface { + match([]addr) bool +} + +type hostPattern struct { + negate bool + addr addr +} + +func (p *hostPattern) String() string { + n := "" + if p.negate { + n = "!" + } + + return n + p.addr.String() +} + +type hostPatterns []hostPattern + +func (ps hostPatterns) match(addrs []addr) bool { + matched := false + for _, p := range ps { + for _, a := range addrs { + m := p.match(a) + if !m { + continue + } + if p.negate { + return false + } + matched = true + } + } + return matched +} + +// See +// https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/openssh/+/ab28f5495c85297e7a597c1ba62e996416da7c7e/addrmatch.c +// The matching of * has no regard for separators, unlike filesystem globs +func wildcardMatch(pat []byte, str []byte) bool { + for { + if len(pat) == 0 { + return len(str) == 0 + } + if len(str) == 0 { + return false + } + + if pat[0] == '*' { + if len(pat) == 1 { + return true + } + + for j := range str { + if wildcardMatch(pat[1:], str[j:]) { + return true + } + } + return false + } + + if pat[0] == '?' || pat[0] == str[0] { + pat = pat[1:] + str = str[1:] + } else { + return false + } + } +} + +func (p *hostPattern) match(a addr) bool { + return wildcardMatch([]byte(p.addr.host), []byte(a.host)) && p.addr.port == a.port +} + +type keyDBLine struct { + cert bool + matcher matcher + knownKey KnownKey +} + +func serialize(k ssh.PublicKey) string { + return k.Type() + " " + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(k.Marshal()) +} + +func (l *keyDBLine) match(addrs []addr) bool { + return l.matcher.match(addrs) +} + +type hostKeyDB struct { + // Serialized version of revoked keys + revoked map[string]*KnownKey + lines []keyDBLine +} + +func newHostKeyDB() *hostKeyDB { + db := &hostKeyDB{ + revoked: make(map[string]*KnownKey), + } + + return db +} + +func keyEq(a, b ssh.PublicKey) bool { + return bytes.Equal(a.Marshal(), b.Marshal()) +} + +// IsAuthorityForHost can be used as a callback in ssh.CertChecker +func (db *hostKeyDB) IsHostAuthority(remote ssh.PublicKey, address string) bool { + h, p, err := net.SplitHostPort(address) + if err != nil { + return false + } + a := addr{host: h, port: p} + + for _, l := range db.lines { + if l.cert && keyEq(l.knownKey.Key, remote) && l.match([]addr{a}) { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// IsRevoked can be used as a callback in ssh.CertChecker +func (db *hostKeyDB) IsRevoked(key *ssh.Certificate) bool { + _, ok := db.revoked[string(key.Marshal())] + return ok +} + +const markerCert = "@cert-authority" +const markerRevoked = "@revoked" + +func nextWord(line []byte) (string, []byte) { + i := bytes.IndexAny(line, "\t ") + if i == -1 { + return string(line), nil + } + + return string(line[:i]), bytes.TrimSpace(line[i:]) +} + +func parseLine(line []byte) (marker, host string, key ssh.PublicKey, err error) { + if w, next := nextWord(line); w == markerCert || w == markerRevoked { + marker = w + line = next + } + + host, line = nextWord(line) + if len(line) == 0 { + return "", "", nil, errors.New("knownhosts: missing host pattern") + } + + // ignore the keytype as it's in the key blob anyway. + _, line = nextWord(line) + if len(line) == 0 { + return "", "", nil, errors.New("knownhosts: missing key type pattern") + } + + keyBlob, _ := nextWord(line) + + keyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(keyBlob) + if err != nil { + return "", "", nil, err + } + key, err = ssh.ParsePublicKey(keyBytes) + if err != nil { + return "", "", nil, err + } + + return marker, host, key, nil +} + +func (db *hostKeyDB) parseLine(line []byte, filename string, linenum int) error { + marker, pattern, key, err := parseLine(line) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + if marker == markerRevoked { + db.revoked[string(key.Marshal())] = &KnownKey{ + Key: key, + Filename: filename, + Line: linenum, + } + + return nil + } + + entry := keyDBLine{ + cert: marker == markerCert, + knownKey: KnownKey{ + Filename: filename, + Line: linenum, + Key: key, + }, + } + + if pattern[0] == '|' { + entry.matcher, err = newHashedHost(pattern) + } else { + entry.matcher, err = newHostnameMatcher(pattern) + } + + if err != nil { + return err + } + + db.lines = append(db.lines, entry) + return nil +} + +func newHostnameMatcher(pattern string) (matcher, error) { + var hps hostPatterns + for _, p := range strings.Split(pattern, ",") { + if len(p) == 0 { + continue + } + + var a addr + var negate bool + if p[0] == '!' { + negate = true + p = p[1:] + } + + if len(p) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("knownhosts: negation without following hostname") + } + + var err error + if p[0] == '[' { + a.host, a.port, err = net.SplitHostPort(p) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } else { + a.host, a.port, err = net.SplitHostPort(p) + if err != nil { + a.host = p + a.port = "22" + } + } + hps = append(hps, hostPattern{ + negate: negate, + addr: a, + }) + } + return hps, nil +} + +// KnownKey represents a key declared in a known_hosts file. +type KnownKey struct { + Key ssh.PublicKey + Filename string + Line int +} + +func (k *KnownKey) String() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d: %s", k.Filename, k.Line, serialize(k.Key)) +} + +// KeyError is returned if we did not find the key in the host key +// database, or there was a mismatch. Typically, in batch +// applications, this should be interpreted as failure. Interactive +// applications can offer an interactive prompt to the user. +type KeyError struct { + // Want holds the accepted host keys. For each key algorithm, + // there can be one hostkey. If Want is empty, the host is + // unknown. If Want is non-empty, there was a mismatch, which + // can signify a MITM attack. + Want []KnownKey +} + +func (u *KeyError) Error() string { + if len(u.Want) == 0 { + return "knownhosts: key is unknown" + } + return "knownhosts: key mismatch" +} + +// RevokedError is returned if we found a key that was revoked. +type RevokedError struct { + Revoked KnownKey +} + +func (r *RevokedError) Error() string { + return "knownhosts: key is revoked" +} + +// check checks a key against the host database. This should not be +// used for verifying certificates. +func (db *hostKeyDB) check(address string, remote net.Addr, remoteKey ssh.PublicKey) error { + if revoked := db.revoked[string(remoteKey.Marshal())]; revoked != nil { + return &RevokedError{Revoked: *revoked} + } + + host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(remote.String()) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("knownhosts: SplitHostPort(%s): %v", remote, err) + } + + addrs := []addr{ + {host, port}, + } + + if address != "" { + host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(address) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("knownhosts: SplitHostPort(%s): %v", address, err) + } + + addrs = append(addrs, addr{host, port}) + } + + return db.checkAddrs(addrs, remoteKey) +} + +// checkAddrs checks if we can find the given public key for any of +// the given addresses. If we only find an entry for the IP address, +// or only the hostname, then this still succeeds. +func (db *hostKeyDB) checkAddrs(addrs []addr, remoteKey ssh.PublicKey) error { + // TODO(hanwen): are these the right semantics? What if there + // is just a key for the IP address, but not for the + // hostname? + + // Algorithm => key. + knownKeys := map[string]KnownKey{} + for _, l := range db.lines { + if l.match(addrs) { + typ := l.knownKey.Key.Type() + if _, ok := knownKeys[typ]; !ok { + knownKeys[typ] = l.knownKey + } + } + } + + keyErr := &KeyError{} + for _, v := range knownKeys { + keyErr.Want = append(keyErr.Want, v) + } + + // Unknown remote host. + if len(knownKeys) == 0 { + return keyErr + } + + // If the remote host starts using a different, unknown key type, we + // also interpret that as a mismatch. + if known, ok := knownKeys[remoteKey.Type()]; !ok || !keyEq(known.Key, remoteKey) { + return keyErr + } + + return nil +} + +// The Read function parses file contents. +func (db *hostKeyDB) Read(r io.Reader, filename string) error { + scanner := bufio.NewScanner(r) + + lineNum := 0 + for scanner.Scan() { + lineNum++ + line := scanner.Bytes() + line = bytes.TrimSpace(line) + if len(line) == 0 || line[0] == '#' { + continue + } + + if err := db.parseLine(line, filename, lineNum); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("knownhosts: %s:%d: %v", filename, lineNum, err) + } + } + return scanner.Err() +} + +// New creates a host key callback from the given OpenSSH host key +// files. The returned callback is for use in +// ssh.ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback. +func New(files ...string) (ssh.HostKeyCallback, error) { + db := newHostKeyDB() + for _, fn := range files { + f, err := os.Open(fn) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer f.Close() + if err := db.Read(f, fn); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + + var certChecker ssh.CertChecker + certChecker.IsHostAuthority = db.IsHostAuthority + certChecker.IsRevoked = db.IsRevoked + certChecker.HostKeyFallback = db.check + + return certChecker.CheckHostKey, nil +} + +// Normalize normalizes an address into the form used in known_hosts +func Normalize(address string) string { + host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(address) + if err != nil { + host = address + port = "22" + } + entry := host + if port != "22" { + entry = "[" + entry + "]:" + port + } else if strings.Contains(host, ":") && !strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") { + entry = "[" + entry + "]" + } + return entry +} + +// Line returns a line to add append to the known_hosts files. +func Line(addresses []string, key ssh.PublicKey) string { + var trimmed []string + for _, a := range addresses { + trimmed = append(trimmed, Normalize(a)) + } + + return strings.Join(trimmed, ",") + " " + serialize(key) +} + +// HashHostname hashes the given hostname. The hostname is not +// normalized before hashing. +func HashHostname(hostname string) string { + // TODO(hanwen): check if we can safely normalize this always. + salt := make([]byte, sha1.Size) + + _, err := rand.Read(salt) + if err != nil { + panic(fmt.Sprintf("crypto/rand failure %v", err)) + } + + hash := hashHost(hostname, salt) + return encodeHash(sha1HashType, salt, hash) +} + +func decodeHash(encoded string) (hashType string, salt, hash []byte, err error) { + if len(encoded) == 0 || encoded[0] != '|' { + err = errors.New("knownhosts: hashed host must start with '|'") + return + } + components := strings.Split(encoded, "|") + if len(components) != 4 { + err = fmt.Errorf("knownhosts: got %d components, want 3", len(components)) + return + } + + hashType = components[1] + if salt, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(components[2]); err != nil { + return + } + if hash, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(components[3]); err != nil { + return + } + return +} + +func encodeHash(typ string, salt []byte, hash []byte) string { + return strings.Join([]string{"", + typ, + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(salt), + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(hash), + }, "|") +} + +// See https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/openssh/+/ab28f5495c85297e7a597c1ba62e996416da7c7e/hostfile.c#120 +func hashHost(hostname string, salt []byte) []byte { + mac := hmac.New(sha1.New, salt) + mac.Write([]byte(hostname)) + return mac.Sum(nil) +} + +type hashedHost struct { + salt []byte + hash []byte +} + +const sha1HashType = "1" + +func newHashedHost(encoded string) (*hashedHost, error) { + typ, salt, hash, err := decodeHash(encoded) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // The type field seems for future algorithm agility, but it's + // actually hardcoded in openssh currently, see + // https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/openssh/+/ab28f5495c85297e7a597c1ba62e996416da7c7e/hostfile.c#120 + if typ != sha1HashType { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("knownhosts: got hash type %s, must be '1'", typ) + } + + return &hashedHost{salt: salt, hash: hash}, nil +} + +func (h *hashedHost) match(addrs []addr) bool { + for _, a := range addrs { + if bytes.Equal(hashHost(Normalize(a.String()), h.salt), h.hash) { + return true + } + } + return false +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go index 01150eb89..f6fae1db4 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package ssh import ( "bufio" + "bytes" "errors" "io" "log" @@ -232,52 +233,22 @@ var ( clientKeys = direction{[]byte{'A'}, []byte{'C'}, []byte{'E'}} ) -// generateKeys generates key material for IV, MAC and encryption. -func generateKeys(d direction, algs directionAlgorithms, kex *kexResult) (iv, key, macKey []byte) { - cipherMode := cipherModes[algs.Cipher] - macMode := macModes[algs.MAC] - - iv = make([]byte, cipherMode.ivSize) - key = make([]byte, cipherMode.keySize) - macKey = make([]byte, macMode.keySize) - - generateKeyMaterial(iv, d.ivTag, kex) - generateKeyMaterial(key, d.keyTag, kex) - generateKeyMaterial(macKey, d.macKeyTag, kex) - return -} - // setupKeys sets the cipher and MAC keys from kex.K, kex.H and sessionId, as // described in RFC 4253, section 6.4. direction should either be serverKeys // (to setup server->client keys) or clientKeys (for client->server keys). func newPacketCipher(d direction, algs directionAlgorithms, kex *kexResult) (packetCipher, error) { - iv, key, macKey := generateKeys(d, algs, kex) + cipherMode := cipherModes[algs.Cipher] + macMode := macModes[algs.MAC] - if algs.Cipher == gcmCipherID { - return newGCMCipher(iv, key) - } + iv := make([]byte, cipherMode.ivSize) + key := make([]byte, cipherMode.keySize) + macKey := make([]byte, macMode.keySize) - if algs.Cipher == aes128cbcID { - return newAESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey, algs) - } + generateKeyMaterial(iv, d.ivTag, kex) + generateKeyMaterial(key, d.keyTag, kex) + generateKeyMaterial(macKey, d.macKeyTag, kex) - if algs.Cipher == tripledescbcID { - return newTripleDESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey, algs) - } - - c := &streamPacketCipher{ - mac: macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey), - etm: macModes[algs.MAC].etm, - } - c.macResult = make([]byte, c.mac.Size()) - - var err error - c.cipher, err = cipherModes[algs.Cipher].createStream(key, iv) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - return c, nil + return cipherModes[algs.Cipher].create(key, iv, macKey, algs) } // generateKeyMaterial fills out with key material generated from tag, K, H @@ -342,7 +313,7 @@ func readVersion(r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { var ok bool var buf [1]byte - for len(versionString) < maxVersionStringBytes { + for length := 0; length < maxVersionStringBytes; length++ { _, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf[:]) if err != nil { return nil, err @@ -350,6 +321,13 @@ func readVersion(r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { // The RFC says that the version should be terminated with \r\n // but several SSH servers actually only send a \n. if buf[0] == '\n' { + if !bytes.HasPrefix(versionString, []byte("SSH-")) { + // RFC 4253 says we need to ignore all version string lines + // except the one containing the SSH version (provided that + // all the lines do not exceed 255 bytes in total). + versionString = versionString[:0] + continue + } ok = true break } diff --git a/vendor/vendor.json b/vendor/vendor.json index 4da4a0692..d8787b172 100644 --- a/vendor/vendor.json +++ b/vendor/vendor.json @@ -2263,6 +2263,12 @@ "revision": "453249f01cfeb54c3d549ddb75ff152ca243f9d8", "revisionTime": "2017-02-08T20:51:15Z" }, + { + "checksumSHA1": "hfABw6DX9B4Ma+88qDDGz9qY45s=", + "path": "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20", + "revision": "9de5f2eaf759b4c4550b3db39fed2e9e5f86f45c", + "revisionTime": "2018-02-11T11:39:43Z" + }, { "checksumSHA1": "MCeXr2RNeiG1XG6V+er1OR0qyeo=", "path": "golang.org/x/crypto/md4", @@ -2306,10 +2312,16 @@ "revisionTime": "2017-02-08T20:51:15Z" }, { - "checksumSHA1": "pySTR3iSeU7FhjbBnQPNxgyIa4I=", + "checksumSHA1": "kVKE0OX1Xdw5mG7XKT86DLLKE2I=", + "path": "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305", + "revision": "9de5f2eaf759b4c4550b3db39fed2e9e5f86f45c", + "revisionTime": "2018-02-11T11:39:43Z" + }, + { + "checksumSHA1": "ZK4HWtg3hJzayz0RRcc6qHpkums=", "path": "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh", - "revision": "d585fd2cc9195196078f516b69daff6744ef5e84", - "revisionTime": "2017-12-16T04:08:15Z", + "revision": "9de5f2eaf759b4c4550b3db39fed2e9e5f86f45c", + "revisionTime": "2018-02-11T11:39:43Z", "version": "master", "versionExact": "master" }, @@ -2321,6 +2333,14 @@ "version": "master", "versionExact": "master" }, + { + "checksumSHA1": "He3gVAAa2cym6sK3f2tgZoCMdOk=", + "path": "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts", + "revision": "650f4a345ab4e5b245a3034b110ebc7299e68186", + "revisionTime": "2017-09-27T09:16:38Z", + "version": "master", + "versionExact": "master" + }, { "checksumSHA1": "9jjO5GjLa0XF/nfWihF02RoH4qc=", "path": "golang.org/x/net/context", diff --git a/website/docs/provisioners/connection.html.markdown b/website/docs/provisioners/connection.html.markdown index 9a499bcab..10954f4d1 100644 --- a/website/docs/provisioners/connection.html.markdown +++ b/website/docs/provisioners/connection.html.markdown @@ -83,6 +83,9 @@ provisioner "file" { * `agent_identity` - The preferred identity from the ssh agent for authentication. +* `host_key` - The public key from the remote host or the signing CA, used to + verify the connection. + **Additional arguments only supported by the `winrm` connection type:** * `https` - Set to `true` to connect using HTTPS instead of HTTP. @@ -100,6 +103,9 @@ The `ssh` connection also supports the following fields to facilitate connnectio * `bastion_host` - Setting this enables the bastion Host connection. This host will be connected to first, and then the `host` connection will be made from there. +* `bastion_host_key` - The public key from the remote host or the signing CA, + used to verify the host connection. + * `bastion_port` - The port to use connect to the bastion host. Defaults to the value of the `port` field.